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  Protection of property rights is a key determinant of the efficient operation of 
contracts and the development of financial institutions.  The critical question is why some 
countries have managed to develop strong protection of property rights, while others have 
not. A substantial body of theoretical work tries to explain the historical determinants of 
these differences. There is also a growing body of empirical work that assesses the 
relative contribution of different historical determinants in cross-country variation of 
property rights protection.    
  However, attempts at empirical validation of institutional theories face challenges 
stemming from severe data limitations. There is only one realization of the data with 
relatively few observations, which have by now been well explored in the literature. 
Given the overlapping nature of the theories of property rights, it is difficult to fashion 
empirical tests which are consistent in their treatment of the competing theories. Different 
investigators focusing on different variables may find different specifications persuasive 
to test and to report. Moreover, it is possible to quickly develop a heuristic about which 
variables are jointly significant in the regressions. This is a matter of concern because 
out-of-sample tests are not feasible. Similar concerns exist in the asset pricing literature, 
where Foster, Smith and Whaley (1997) show that there is a significant bias “when a 
researcher has had access to many potential regressors (or, equivalently, has read past 
research that suggested which regressors to choose)”.
1 
                                                 
1 The implicit assumption in standard statistical tests (F-test, R-square) is that only one test is conducted 
with a particular data set. However, using the same dataset repeatedly in future empirical studies is open to 
data instigated pretest biases as discussed in Leamer (1978). While the institutions literature has so far 
ignored these limitations, data snooping biases have been studied extensively in the asset pricing literature 
(Merton, 1987; Black, 1993; Lo and MacKinlay, 1990, 1997). Lo and MacKinlay (1990) in particular, 
show that standard tests of significance are not valid when the construction of the test statistics is 
influenced by empirical relations derived from the very same data to be used in the test.   3
  In this paper we address these issues by adopting an empirical approach that relies 
on the data rather than investigator discretion to specify a model linking property rights 
and a set of potential explanatory variables advanced in the literature. Our approach treats 
the potential explanatory variables together and evenhandedly, and allows us to explore 
relations between them. Empirically, we use cross country data on 158 countries and 
evaluate four theories concerning historical determinants of property rights protection. 
While there are overlaps, the four theories focus on different and distinct causal 
mechanisms in shaping institutions, as captured by legal origin, endowments, ethnic 
diversity and religion. We begin with a set of variables suggested by the institutional 
theories and then allow the data to reject potential causal relations between these 
variables and property rights protection. At the end of the process, we are left with a set 
of potential causal relations between our measure of property rights protection and the set 
of proposed explanatory variables. The procedure also suggests possible relations among 
the set of proposed explanatory variables.  
  Specifically, we employ Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) methodology developed 
in computer science that allows us to consistently evaluate the four theories concerning 
historical determinants of property rights protection (Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines, 
2000). This algorithm uses the correlation matrix of a set of variables to determine 
whether a variable meets certain criteria, derived from probability and graph theory, for it 
to be classified as a direct or indirect cause of another variable. Using this methodology, 
whose purpose is to discover causal patterns in the data, we are able to identify which 
historical factors are direct determinants of property rights protection and which are not. 
We subject the results to a battery of robustness tests and compare our methodology to   4
regression analysis to illustrate how a regression-based analysis of the question can lead 
to misleading results.   
  Our results show that at the 5% and 10% significance level, Common Law, 
Latitude and Ethnic Fractionalization are all significant predictors of property rights 
protection where as Catholic Religion is not. However at the 1% significance level, only 
ethnic fractionalization is a causal determinant of property rights protection. Further, 
Ethnic Fractionalization is the only variable which is robust to different sample 
compositions where as the effect of Latitude and Common Law is strongly dependent on 
the sample of countries under study.  The data offers only limited support for the 
proposition that Common Law origin or Latitude is a determinant of property rights 
protection and the support is not robust to different definitions of the variable or sample 
composition  
  Our paper is related to Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) and Ayyagari, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005a).  Using firm-level survey data, Ayyagari, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005a) evaluate determinants of firm level perceptions 
of property rights protection and find the ethnic fractionalization and endowments view 
to explain a greater proportion of variation in the data compared to other historical factors  
However, they consider one variable at a time and do not rule out any variable. Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) find more evidence supporting the law and finance 
view.  However, in this paper we are able to illustrate how the regression-based 
methodologies, as normally applied, can be misleading in identifying causal factors and 
that legal origin is not a robust determinant of property rights protection.    5
  Our paper is most closely related in spirit to Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Barro 
(1991), Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997). These authors examine a 
parallel problem: determining which of many possible proposed macroeconomic 
variables could reliably be classified as predictors of economic growth. Kormendi and 
Meguire (1985), Barro (1991), and Levine and Renelt (1992) use Extreme Bounds 
Analysis (EBA) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) uses a similar technique. DAG analysis has 
several advantages over these methods. Whereas these methods start from an equation 
that is specified by the researcher that embodies a causal ordering that is then tested, 
DAG can endogenously discover the causal ordering.  Moreover, whereas EBA treats one 
relation at a time, the graphs produced by DAG show robust relations between all the 
variables being analyzed, taking into account the implications of robust relations 
elsewhere in the system, on the causal ordering in a specific relation. The DAG analysis 
also allows the researcher to explore the implications of imposing a causal restriction in 
one relation on robust relations throughout the system.  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
hypotheses we investigate. Section 3 outlines the empirical methodology and the data.  
Section 4 applies the methodology to identify historical determinants of property rights 
and presents the main results, comparing them to regression analysis.  Section 5 provides 
additional robustness results, with different samples of countries and alternative variable 
definitions and compares DAG methodology to Extreme Bounds Analysis and a 
methodology for examining robustness due to Sala-i-Martin (1997).  Section 6 concludes. 
 
   6
2. Institutional Theories of Property Rights Protection 
  We evaluate four potential historical determinants of property rights protection. 
First, the law and finance view predicts that historically determined differences in legal 
traditions help explain differences in protection of property rights today (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, hereafter LLSV, 1998).  Focusing on the 
differences between the two most influential legal traditions, the British Common law 
and the French Civil law, this theory holds that legal traditions differ in terms of the 
priority they attach to protecting the rights of private investors against the state (Hayek, 
1960).  The reasons for the differences can be found in the way different legal traditions 
evolved. While the British Common law evolved to protect private property owners 
against the crown (Merryman, 1985), the French Civil law evolved to eliminate the role 
of a corrupt judiciary by restraining courts from interfering with state policy and to 
solidify the power of the state.  Over time, these trends led French Civil law to focus on 
the rights of the state and less on the rights of the individual investors when compared to 
British Common law (Mahoney, 2001). Thus, the law and finance theory predicts legal 
origin to be an important determinant of property rights protection, with countries that 
have adopted the British Common law tradition placing much more emphasis on such 
protections than countries with the French Civil law tradition.  As these legal origins 
spread around the world through colonization, British colonizers brought with them a 
legal tradition that stressed private property rights protection, while French colonizers 
spread a legal tradition that is less conducive to such protection.  
 Second,  the  endowment view emphasizes the role of geography and the disease 
environment in shaping the institutional environment and the property rights that   7
underline such development.   Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) argue that it is 
not the identity of the colonizer but the colonization strategy that determined the extent of 
property rights protection.  In settler colonies such as the United States, Australia and 
New Zealand, Europeans settled themselves and created institutions to protect private 
property rights and check the power of the state. On the other hand, in colonies where the 
colonization strategy was to extract resources from the indigenous population rather than 
settle, Europeans did not create institutions to protect property rights.  Instead, they 
created institutions to empower the elite to extract natural resources, as in the case of 
Congo, Ivory Coast, and Latin America.  Acemoglu et al. (2001) also argue that the 
colonization strategy was very much determined by the feasibility of settlement and the 
disease environment.   Consistent with this theory, countries that are closer to the equator 
tended to have a more tropical climate that was inhospitable to European settlers and 
therefore more likely fostered extractive institutions as opposed to institutions that protect 
property rights.   Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) note another channel through which 
geographical endowments shape property rights protection.  They show that agriculture in 
southern North America and most of South America is conducive to large plantations, 
and thus have led colonists to develop institutions to protect few landowners against 
many peasants.  In contrast, North America’s agriculture is conducive to small farms, so 
more egalitarian institutions emerged, with greater emphasis on protection of property 
rights. 
  Third, political theories predict that governments become more interventionist as 
ethnic heterogeneity of a country increases.  Studies have shown that in more ethnically 
diverse countries, the groups that come to power implement policies that expropriate as   8
much as possible from other ethnic groups, restrict their rights, and prohibit the growth of 
industries or sectors that threaten the ethnic group in power (Alesina et al., 2003; Easterly 
and Levine, 1997)
2.  Thus the Ethnic Diversity view would predict that countries with 
greater ethnic fractionalization are less likely to protect property rights.   
  Finally, many scholars also argue that religion shapes national views regarding 
protection of property rights (LLSV, 1999; Stulz and Williamson, 2003).   Scholars argue 
that the Catholic religion fostered authoritarian societies, rather than egalitarian ones that 
lead to powerful bonds between church and the state, limiting private property rights 
protection (Putnam, 1993; Landes, 1998).  Thus, the fourth view, Religion, predicts that 
religious differences and the system of beliefs and culture that stem from such differences 
can explain differences in property rights protection across countries.    
  Each theory argues very distinct mechanisms about how different historical 
factors – legal tradition, disease and geography endowments, ethnic diversity, and 
religion – shaped national views toward property rights protection.  Though the theories 
are not mutually exclusive, they do focus on very different mechanisms.  We empirically 
evaluate which of these historical mechanisms are causally related to property rights 
protection today. 
 
3. Directed Acyclic Graphs 
  The Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) methodology selects models that are 
compatible with the data using an objective algorithm derived from a small number of 
axioms. The models selected by DAG can then be submitted to standard regression 
                                                 
2 As noted by Alesina et al (2003), ethnic fractionalization has also been found empirically to predict lower 
levels of trust, less efficient public services and less favorable economic outcomes in US localities.   9
analysis for parameter estimation. The output of the algorithm is a set of graphical 
relations between the different variables. The graphs provide a compact representation of 
joint probability distributions with the nodes of the graphs representing the random 
variables and the edges (rather the lack thereof) connecting the nodes, representing 
conditional independence assumptions. We describe below the assumptions behind 
linking probability dependence/independence relations to causal inference and illustrate 
how the software program TETRAD produces a causal pattern from raw data and 
conclude with a specific example of how supplementing regression analysis with DAGs 
can be useful and provides more accurate results.  
  A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is a picture or a path diagram representing causal 
flow between or among a set of variables. For example, given a set of three vertices: {X1, 
X2, X3}, and a set of two edges among these vertices: {X1 Æ X2, X2 Æ X3}, the 
corresponding DAG would be:  
X1Æ X2 Æ X3. 
  For the above DAG to be ascribed causal inference, we need the Causal Markov 
Condition. Formally, the Causal Markov Condition states that for a variable Y and any 
set of variables X that does not include the effects of Y, Y is probabilistically 
independent of X conditional on the direct causes of Y.
3 The intuition in the Causal 
Markov assumption is that each variable is independent of all other variables that are not 
its effects, conditional on its immediate causes. So the above DAG implies that X3 is 
independent of X1 conditional on X2. . The Causal Markov Condition also asserts that if 
X and Y are related only as effects of a common cause Z, then X and Y are 
probabilistically independent conditional on Z. 
                                                 
3 The Causal Markov Condition is equivalent to d-separation in graph theory, Pearl (1988).   10
  The key intuition in discovering a causal pattern from observational data is that, 
under the Causal Markov condition, observed patterns of statistical independence limit 
the number of possible causal graphs compatible with the observed data.  Specifically, 
when considering the individual relation between an outcome variable  Y and potential 
cause Xi in DAG analysis, the Causal Markov Condition requires that a variable Xi is 
identified as being a direct cause of outcome variable Y only if Xi and Y are dependent 
conditional on every subset of X - { Xi , Y } (Scheines, 2001).  In contrast, in regression 
analysis, Xi is identified as being a significant predictor of outcome variable Y only if Xi 
and Y are dependent conditional on the entire regressor matrix i.e. on exactly the set  
X - {Xi  , Y }. We illustrate this in the following sub-sections. 
Consider again the above example with variables X1, X2 and X3, where, say, we 
observe from the data that X1 and X3 are independent conditioning on X2. This 
observation implies that the causal graph  
X1ÆX2ÅX3 
is incompatible with the data, since if X1 and X3 were both causes of X2, then 
conditioning on X2 would render X1 and X3 statistically dependent
4. The causal graphs 
that  are  compatible with the observed independence pattern include the one we saw 
earlier on  
X1ÆX2ÆX3 
as well as 
                                                 
4 The same is more intuitive to understand when we view this as the relationship between two independent 
causes (X1 and X3) after we condition on a common effect (X2). Consider the following example from 
Pearl (1988), in which there are two independent causes for a car refusing to start: having no gas and 
having a dead battery. So dead battery Æ car won’t start Å no gas. Having information that the battery is 
charged does not tell us anything about whether or not there is gas in the fuel tank. But having information 
that the battery is charged after knowing that the car won’t start indicates that the gas tank must be empty. 
So independent causes are made dependent by conditioning on a common effect.    11
X1ÅX2ÅX3 and X1ÅX2ÆX3. 
  We can take the observed data, either in raw form or as correlations (and the 
independence conditions they embody) as input, and use algorithms to search for all 
compatible graphs.  
In some cases there is not enough information in the data to fully specify a unique 
graph and to identify the dependent from the independent variables. The number of 
compatible graphs can often be significantly reduced, (maybe to even one) with added 
assumptions based on prior theory or knowledge of temporal order of the variables. 
Thus, for example, prior knowledge that X2 precedes X3 rules out two of the preceding 
graphs.  
While the use of prior knowledge to specify models is an integral component of 
all empirical work, DAG methodology immediately reveals how an a priori assumption 
interacts with the data to rule out relations about which the researcher may have no prior 
information.  Thus, for example, a restriction based on theory that X2 precedes X3 also 
implies in the above example that X1ÎX2.   
In addition to the Causal Markov condition, the DAG methodology relies on two 
other principal axiomatic assumptions:  
(a) Faithfulness (or Stability): Assuming that a population is Faithful is to assume 
that whatever independencies occur in it arise not from incredible coincidence but 
rather from structure.  
  If there are any independence relations in the population that are not a 
consequence of the Causal Markov condition, then the population is unfaithful. For 
instance, if in the above example we had {X1 Æ X2, X2 Æ X3 and X1 Æ X3}, applying   12
the Causal Markov Condition gives no independence relations. However, by coincidence 
X1 could be independent of X3 (Say X1 has a negative direct effect on X3 but X1 has a 
positive effect on X2 which has a positive effect on X3. If the direct and indirect effects 
of X1 on X3 exactly cancel each other, then there will be no association between X1 and 
X3). In such a case, the population is said to be unfaithful to the causal graph that 
generated it. 
(b) Causal Sufficiency: Causal Sufficiency is satisfied if we have measured all the 
common causes of the measured variables.  
  The causal sufficiency assumption is similar to the standard assumption in most 
econometric specifications where we assume that there are no latent (absent) variables 
that are driving the covariance matrix and that the variables in the dataset are sufficient to 
explain relations among the variables. 
The DAG methodology is related to another methodology which has been used in 
the literature to check for robustness of estimated relations, Extreme Bounds Analysis. 
Extreme Bounds Analysis starts with a statistically significant regression between an a-
priori determined outcome variable Y and variable Xi which is believed to be a direct 
cause of Y and that belongs to a set of potentially relevant causal variables X.  If  Xi 
causes Y, then regressing Y on both Xi  and any subset of X - { Xi , Y } should not affect 
the sign and statistical significance of the relation between Xi  and  Y (Leamer,1983).   
Accordingly, in EBA, Y is in turn regressed on both Xi  and every subset of X - { Xi , Y }
5 
to find the widest range of coefficient estimates on Xi, that standard hypothesis tests do 
not reject. The highest and lowest values of the coefficients of Xi are determined and the 
                                                 
5 Due to concerns about multicollinearity and also the number of iterations involved when we have many 
variables, most studies using EBA restrict the conditioning subset to three variables, including Kormendi 
and Meguire (1985), Barro (1991), Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997).   13
extreme upper bound is defined by the group of X variables that produces the maximum 
value of bi plus two standard deviations and the extreme lower bound is defined as 
minimum value of bi plus two standard deviations.  If the original relation between Y and 
variable Xi remains statistically significant and of the same sign at the two extreme 
bounds, then, the relation between the two variables is considered robust. Note that EBA 
can only be performed on regressor variables that are significant to start with in the 
original regression. 
  Analogously, when considering the individual relation between an outcome 
variable Y and potential cause Xi in DAG analysis, the Causal Markov Condition 
requires that a variable Xi is identified as being a direct cause of outcome variable Y only 
if Xi and Y are dependent conditional on every subset of X - { Xi , Y } (Scheines, 2001). 
However, DAG analysis has several advantages over EBA. DAG can endogenously 
discover the causal ordering from the data, which in EBA is required to be specified by 
the researcher. In addition, DAG considers the whole system of variables X, with the 
graphs taking into account, the implications of robust relations elsewhere in the system 
on the causal ordering in a specific relation. EBA on the other hand treats only one 
relation at a time. The DAG analysis also allows the researcher to explore the 
implications of imposing a causal restriction in one relation on robust relations 
throughout the system. 
  
3.1 Data 
We examine a sample of 158 countries for which data on property rights 
protection is available. Table 1 shows the countries in our sample. Property Rights is an   14
index of the degree to which the government protects private property and enforces laws 
that protect private property. The data are for 2000 and were obtained from the Index of 
Economic Freedom constructed by the Heritage Foundation. The index is available for a 
large number of countries and has been recently used in several papers including 
Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton (1998), LLSV (1999, 2002), Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine (2003) and Claessens and Laeven (2003). Within our sample, property 
rights varies from a score of 5 for countries with good property rights protection like the 
United States to 1 for countries like the Congo Democratic Republic, Libya and Vietnam.  
  The countries in our sample belong to different legal traditions and the data on 
legal families is taken from LLSV (1998). Since the literature has argued that common 
law countries have a significant advantage over civil and socialist law traditions and 
regressions typically only distinguish between common law countries and civil law 
countries (see, for instance, LLSV(1998), Stulz and Williamson (2003), Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine (2003)), we use the dummy variable Common Law, which takes the 
value 1 for English common law countries and 0 for countries of all other legal traditions. 
Moreover, it is not clear what the distinctions between the civil law (Scandinavian, 
German and French) countries really mean. For instance, Nenova (2003) shows that the 
benefits from control are lower in countries with a Scandinavian civil law tradition than 
in common law countries while Coffee (2001) argues that social norms rather than legal 
regimes can explain these lower benefits of control. Small sample sizes of German and 
Scandinavian civil law countries also prevent us from making finer distinctions between 
the civil law countries.   15
  The data on religious composition is taken from LLSV (1999) to create the 
dummy variable Catholic Religion which takes the value 1 if Catholics are the dominant 
religious group in the country, and 0 if the dominant religious group in the country is 
Protestants or Muslims or Other Religions. Stulz and Williamson (2003) show that 
Catholic countries are particularly weak in creditor rights protection as well as the 
enforcement of shareholder rights, creditor rights, and property rights. We also use data 
on Ethnic Fractionalization from Alesina, et al (2003), which measures the probability 
that two randomly selected individuals from a country are from different ethnic groups. 
To measure geographical endowments, we use Latitude, which is the absolute 
value of the latitude of the country scaled between 0 and 1, from LLSV (1999). Countries 
closer to the equator tend to have a more tropical climate that was inhospitable to 
European settlers and therefore may have fostered “extractive” institutions. Table 1 
shows that the variable Latitude varies from 0 for Congo Democratic Republic which is 
located on the Equator and 0.01 for Kenya and Uganda (close to the equator) to 0.72 for 
Iceland. 
Following Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005a), we construct 
quintiles of the continuous variables, Ethnic Fractionalization and Latitude to overcome 
non-linearities in the construction of the variables and use the discrete versions of the 
variables for the rest of our analysis. The search algorithm also works best with only 
continuous or discrete variables rather than with a mix of both types of variables.  
  Table 2 presents the summary statistics and correlation matrix between the 
variables. Panel B shows that Property Rights is highly correlated with Latitude,   16
Common Law and Ethnic Fractionalization at the 1% level but not correlated with the 
Catholic Religion variable.  
 
4. Determinants of property rights. 
The input to the TETRAD algorithm is a correlation (or covariance) matrix of the 
variables
6. One of the advantages of DAG analysis is that it allows us to incorporate prior 
knowledge about a temporal or causal ordering of the variables into the analysis. The 
algorithm uses the correlation matrix input along with the accompanying temporal 
restrictions and begins by assuming that all variables in the model are dependent, 
corresponding to the undirected graph in Figure 1. Under the assumption that the 
variables are jointly normally distributed, it then checks for conditional independence 
relations between the variables and depending on the relations found in the data, the 
edges between the variables are oriented.  
We investigate three cases (a) When there is no temporal order assumed (b) 
Assuming a two-tier temporal order where property rights is identified as the dependent 
variable and (c) Three-tier temporal order where Tier 1 consists of Latitude, Tier 2 
consists of Common Law, Catholic Religion, and Ethnic Fractionalization and Tier 3 
consists of Property Rights. For each case we present the directed acyclic graphs at 1%, 
5% and 10% significance levels used for computing the significance of the correlation 
coefficients. Because the algorithm performs a complex sequence of statistical tests, each 
at the given significance level, the significance level is not an indication of error 
probabilities of the entire procedure.  Spirtes, Glymour, and Sheines (1993) after 
exploring several versions of the algorithm on simulated data conclude that “in order for 
                                                 
6 TETRAD also allows raw data as input. See the TETRAD III manual for further details.    17
the method to converge to correct decisions with probability 1, the significance level used 
in making decisions should decrease as the sample size increases, and the use of higher 
significance levels may improve performance at small sample sizes.”   
 
In the absence of any temporal ordering between the variables 
We start with the correlation matrix shown in Panel B of Table 2. The algorithm 
uses this input and starts with a complete undirected graph as shown in Figure 1. 
Assuming that the variables are jointly normally distributed, edges are now removed on 
the basis of vanishing correlations or partial (conditional) correlations.  
When no temporal order is assumed and we let the data speak, Table 3 presents 
the conditional independence relations at the 5% significance level found in the data by 
the search algorithm. Table 3 shows that at the 5% level, Property Rights is independent 
of Catholic Religion and hence the edge between Property Rights and Catholic Religion 
is removed from the undirected graph in Figure 1. Further the correlations between 
Catholic Religion and Ethnic Fractionalization and Catholic Religion and Latitude are 
also not significant, leading to removal of the corresponding edges. When we look at the 
conditional correlations, conditional on Latitude, Common Law is independent of Ethnic 
Fractionalization leading to the removal of the direct edge between Common Law and 
Ethnic Fractionalization. The four independence relations shown in Table 3 are consistent 
with a specific causal structure represented by the DAG in Figure 2B. Figure 2B reveals 
that at the 5% level, only Ethnic Fractionalization has a significant and direct impact on 
Property Rights protection. While Common Law and Latitude appear to be related to   18
Property Rights the data is not sufficient to orient the edges between Common law and 
Property Rights and Latitude and Property Rights.
7 
When we repeat the analysis at the 1% and 10% significance levels, the 
independence relations
8 are consistent with the causal structures shown in Figure 2A and 
Figure 2C. Figure 2A reveals that at the 1% level, there is a relation between Property 
Rights and Ethnic Fractionalization (and none between Common Law or Latitude and 
Property Rights). However, the data by itself is not sufficient to orient the direction 
between the Ethnic Fractionalization and Property Rights consistent with any sensible 
theory of property rights. Figure 2c is identical to Figure 2b revealing that the 
independence relations at the 10% significance level are the same as that in Table 3. 
In the present case, there is theoretical justification for presuming that some 
historical factors like latitude are a prior determinant of property rights. Moreover, in the 
absence of further structure, it is not possible to make a suitable comparison between 
DAG and regression analysis or EBA.  In the next section, we proceed by imposing a 




                                                 
7 Figure 2B shows that the direction of orientation between Common Law and Property Rights (dotted line) 
is inconsistent, in that in some instances Common Law is a determinant of Property Rights and in other 
instances, Property Rights is a determinant of Common Law. The double headed arrow between Latitude 
and Property Rights shows that there may be a common latent factor driving the association between these 
two variables. 
8 The independence relations at the 10% level (in this example) are the same as those at the 5% level. At the 
1% level, there are six independence relations. The unconditional correlations reveal that Property Rights is 
independent of both Catholic religion and Common Law, Common Law is independent of Ethnic 
Fractionalization and Catholic Religion is independent of both Ethnic Fractionalization and Latitude are all 
insignificant at the 1% level. The conditional correlations reveal that conditional on Ethnic 
Fractionalization, Property Rights is independent of Latitude.   19
Two-Tier Temporal order 
In this section we impose the condition that the different institutional variables-
Common Law, Ethnic Fractionalization, Catholic Religion and Latitude affect Property 
Rights protection rather than the other way around. So we assume a two-tier temporal 
order where Tier 1 consists of the historical determinants of Property rights, Common 
Law, Latitude, Ethnic Fractionalization and Catholic Religion, and Tier 2 consists of the 
Property Rights variable itself.  We do not make any a-priori assumptions about the 
temporal order among the Tier 1 variables. 
Note that this assumption of temporal order is similar to the multiple regression 
framework when we have Property Rights as the dependent variable and Common Law, 
Ethnic Fractionalization, Latitude and Catholic Religion as the independent variables and 
where we do not explicitly allow for reverse causality. A key difference however, is that, 
although we specify a two tier order in DAG, a temporal order can emerge endogenously 
among the Tier 1 variables depending on the conditional correlations in the data. This is 
clearly not possible in classical regressions.  
Knowledge of temporal precedence allows for limiting the number of tests for 
conditional independence and this can be very useful in reducing the run-time when we 
have several variables
9. Temporal restrictions are implemented as forbidden edges. So in 
this case, since Property Rights is listed in a temporal tier after that of Common Law, the 
search algorithm will not consider models in which Property Rights Protection is a direct 
                                                 
9 In fact, Druzdel and Glymour (1995) argue that TETRAD II's algorithms are much more reliable in 
determining existence of direct causal links than in determining their orientation. Therefore, prior 
knowledge supplied to TETRAD II may be critical for the orientation of edges of the graph. 
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cause of Common Law. Similarly the program will not consider models in which 
Property Rights causes Latitude, Ethnic Fractionalization or Catholic Religion.  
On running the search algorithm with the correlation matrix in Table 2 as an input 
with the temporal restriction specified above, we once again obtain the same set of 
conditional independence relations as in Table 3
10. However, the Directed Acyclic Graph 
that is consistent with the conditional independence relations is quite different as shown 
in Figure 3. The process by which the unique patterns in Figure 3 are determined are 
described in detail for the 5% significance level case (Figure 3B) in Appendix A2.  
Figure 3B implies that at the 5% level, Ethnic Fractionalization, Latitude and 
Common Law all have a direct causal effect on Property Rights.  We now compare the 
set of conditional independence relations in panel A of Table 3 and the accompanying 
Figure 3B with the results from a classical multivariate regression as shown in Table 4.  
We regress the Property Rights variable on all other variables-Common Law, Catholic 
Religion, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Latitude, entered one at a time in specifications 
(1) to (4) of Panel A in Table 4. In subsequent specifications, we try to analyze the 
relation between the regressors themselves by regressing each of the regressors on the 
other regressors.  
Specifications (1) to (4) show that at the 5% level, only Common Law, Latitude 
and Ethnic Fractionalization have significant coefficients in the Property Rights 
regression thus confirming the independence relation between Property Rights and 
Catholic Religion (independence relation I in Table 3). Specifications (5) to (7) reveal 
that Catholic Religion does not predict Latitude confirming the independence relation 
                                                 
10 This is to be expected since imposition of temporal order adds more structure to the analysis but does not 
change the existing independence relations present in the data.   21
(III) in Table 3. Specifications (8) to (10) reveals that Catholic Religion also does not 
predict Ethnic Fractionalization at the 5% level confirming independence relation (II) of 
Table 3. Specifications (11) to (16) provide further verification of the independence 
relations discussed above.  
In Panel B of Table 4, we introduce control variables in the regressions to 
understand the conditional independence relations. For the purposes of this study, it is 
sufficient to illustrate the conditional independence relations with just the Property Rights 
regression. Panel B shows all possible combinations of the independent variables in the 
regression. For a variable to be identified as having a direct effect in DAG, this variable 
should have a significant coefficient in all regressions, with all combinations of the 
independent variables in the model.  Already from specification (4) of Panel B, we can 
see that Catholic Religion does not have a direct causal effect on Property Rights at the 
1% level since it does not have a significant coefficient.  Specifications (5) to (10) in 
Panel B show that Common Law, Ethnic Fractionalization and Catholic Religion are 
significant at the 5% level regardless of which other regressors are entered in the model.   
At the 1% level, panel A of Table 4 shows that only Latitude and Ethnic 
Fractionalization have significant coefficients in the Property Rights regression. However 
specification 5 of panel B rules out Latitude as having a direct effect since its coefficient 
is not significant at the 1% level when entered with Ethnic Fractionalization. At the 1% 
level, only Ethnic Fractionalization has a significant coefficient regardless of which other 
regressors are entered in the model; and Ethnic Fractionalization is also the only causal 
effect identified by DAG analysis in Figure 3A.   22
Thus Panels A and B have shown that the conditional independence relations 
identified by DAG analysis are supported by the partial correlations identified in the 
regression analysis.  The differences between DAG and regression analysis can be seen at 
the 1% level where the DAG pattern in Figure 3a shows Ethnic Fractionalization to be 
the only significant direct cause of Property Rights, where as regression specifications in 
panel B of Table 4 mistakenly identify Ethnic Fractionalization, Latitude and Common 
Law as significant determinants.   
We have also investigated alternative two-tier temporal order structures. For 
example, we can a priori assume that Latitude, being geographically determined, 
precedes all other institutional variables and therefore keep only Latitude in the first tier, 
while all other historical variables are included in the second tier with Property Rights. 
Doing so, at different significance levels, results in exactly the same graphs as in Figure 
3. 
In the following subsection, we investigate whether imposing further temporal 
conditions helps orient the indeterminate edges between the variables shown in Figure 
3A.  
 
 Three-Tier Temporal order 
Next, we impose a three-tier temporal order where Tier 1 consists of Latitude, 
Tier 2 consists of Common Law, Ethnic Fractionalization and Catholic Religion and Tier 
3 consists of Property Rights. The temporal restrictions prevent Property Rights from 
affecting Latitude, Common Law, Ethnic Fractionalization and Catholic Religion and 
also prevent Latitude from being affected by Common Law, Ethnic Fractionalization and   23
Catholic Religion. Note that the temporal order does not imply that Latitude cannot have 
a direct effect on Property Rights.  
Following the input correlation matrix and the above temporal order, DAG 
analysis presents the same set of conditional relations shown in Table 3 and Figure 
4.Figure 4A again reveals that at the 1% level, Ethnic Fractionalization is the only 
variable that has a direct causal influence on Property Rights Protection and Common 
Law is independent of Property Rights Protection
11. However at the 5% significance 
level, Common Law, Ethnic Fractionalization and Latitude all have a direct causal 
influence on Property Rights. This exercise suggests that DAG results are quite stable 
regardless of the temporal order we impose.  
 
4. Robustness Tests 
  In this section we present a number of robustness tests reported in Table 5.  For 
the results in this table we use a significance level of 5 percent.  However, as shown in 
Figure 3 using lower or higher significance levels does not change the result that Ethnic 
Fractionalization has a direct effect on Property Rights. 
  In Panel A, we investigate if our results are sensitive to sample composition.  We 
first present results excluding countries with Socialist legal tradition, as Ayyagari, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005a) argue that these countries are fundamentally 
different from others in their perception of property rights protection.  Next, we also drop 
African, and Latin American countries, respectively. Finally, we exclude Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States from the sample, as these were settler 
                                                 
11 As already discussed above, a similar pattern is obtained if we go with a two-tier temporal order with 
Tier 1: Latitude and Tier 2: Ethnic Fractionalization, Religion, Legal Origin and Property Rights.   24
colonies and their exclusion may impact the role Latitude plays in determining Property 
rights.   The results in Panel A suggest that Ethnic Fractionalization continues to have a 
direct impact on Property Rights, regardless of sample composition and is the only 
variable to do so. The effect of Common Law legal tradition disappears when we drop 
Transition countries or Settler countries and the effect of Latitude disappears when we 
drop African countries or Settler countries.   
  In Panel B, we use an alternative variable to capture the endowment view, Good 
Crops.  It is a measure of the extent to which the country’s land is suitable to growing 
maize, wheat, rice and sugarcane
12 and is expected to proxy for a country’s historical 
agricultural endowments that affected historical institutions (Easterly and Levine (2003)).  
Indeed, when we replace Latitude by Good Crops, we see that Good Crops has a direct 
impact on Property Rights in the baseline specification. However, Good Crops is no 
longer a significant determinant of Property Rights when we drop African countries. 
  As an alternate measure of the endowment view, we use Settler Mortality in Panel 
C of Table 5. Settler Mortality is the log of the annualized deaths per thousand European 
soldiers in European colonies in the early 19
th century. Panel C shows that Settler 
Mortality is the most robust determinant of property rights protection lending support to 
the Endowments View. However these results must be interpreted with caution given the 
small sample sizes. 
  In unreported tables we also experimented with two other measures of 
fractionalization, Religious Fractionalization and Linguistic Fractionalization as defined 
                                                 
12 These are the main crops of focus since Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) argue that wheat and maize 
fostered a large middle class with egalitarian institutions where as rice and sugarcane produced a powerful 
elite and more closed institutions. Latitude has been the preferred proxy for the endowment view because it 
is more accurately measured and is available for a larger number of countries than either Good Crops or 
Settler Mortality.   25
in Alesina et al (2003). Neither of these two measures significantly predict Property 
Rights protection. These results confirm that its ethnicity of the countries, where ethnicity 
is based on a combination of racial and linguistic differences, rather than purely linguistic 
or religious differences that explain Property Rights protection.  
  In Panel D, we explore an alternative measure of Property Rights protection used 
in the literature, Risk of Expropriation. The Risk of Expropriation index is the Political 
Risk Services’ assessment of the protection against government expropriation in the 
country and  is scaled 0-10, where higher scores mean less risk of expropriation of private 
foreign investment by the government. Using these variables instead of the Property 
Rights variable does not alter our main results.  Ethnic Fractionalization still has a direct 
effect on the dependent variable except when we drop African countries when Latitude 
has a direct effect on Property Rights protection. 
  Acemoglu and Johnson (2006) distinguish between determinants of property 
rights institutions and contracting institutions, and suggest that while the endowment 
view determines property rights, legal origin determines contract enforcement.  In Panel 
E, we use the three contract enforcement variables used in their study to see if we also 
observe these differences - Legal formalism from Djankov et al. (2003) measures the 
number of formal legal procedures necessary to resolve the simple disputes of collecting 
on an unpaid check or evicting a non-paying tenant; Number of Procedures is the number 
of formal procedures involved in registering a new business;  and Procedural complexity 
is an index varying between 0 and 100 where higher values indicate more complexity in 
contract enforcement procedures. Number of Procedures and Procedural Complexity are 
from the World Bank’s Doing Business database.    26
  Our results provide some support for their findings.  Common Law, not Ethnic 
Fractionalization or Latitude has a direct effect on Legal Formalism and Procedural 
Complexity.  However, in the case of Procedural Complexity, Catholic Religion also 
enters with a direct effect.  Finally, when we focus on Number of Procedures, both Ethnic 
Fractionalization and Common Law that have a direct effect. Thus, if we were to look at 
Contract Enforcement as opposed to Property Rights protection, Legal Origin has the 
greatest support, followed by Ethnic Fractionalization, and then Religion.    
  In panel F of Table 5, we randomly sample 100 countries and perform 100 trials 
so that in each trial, the set of 100 countries sampled is different. We then report the 
frequency with which each institutional theory is found to be the most dominant predictor 
of Property Rights. Panel F shows that when we randomly sample 100 countries 100 
times, the variable with the highest probability of explaining Property Rights is Ethnic 
Fractionalization. Ethnic Fractionalization is the sole dominant explanatory variable in 
34% of the cases followed by Latitude in 14% of the cases. Common Law and Catholic 
Religion are never the only determinants of Property Rights and always occur in 
conjunction with Ethnic Fractionalization or Latitude 
 
Comparing DAG to Extreme Bounds Analysis 
DAG analysis also has similarities to Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) described 
in Leamer (1983) and subsequently used by Levine and Renelt (1992) and Kormendi and 
Meguire (1985). EBA is designed to test the robustness of coefficient estimates to 
alterations in the conditioning information set, in order to be able to estimate the 
confidence one can place in the conclusions of the cross-country regressions. In EBA, the   27
relationship between property rights protection and a particular variable of interest is 
considered to be robust only if the coefficient remains statistically significant and of the 
theoretically predicted sign when the conditioning variable sets are changed in the 
regressions. So EBA would help us understand if the partial correlations established in 
the regression analysis are robust or fragile to small changes in the set of right hand side 
variables used in the regression. In this aspect it is similar to DAG since it uses the 
conditioning information set to determine the robustness of a particular variable. 
However, EBA looks at one coefficient at a time and the conditioning information set is 
restricted to triads of variables. DAG on the other hand allows us to examine the 
conditional independence relationships between all variables simultaneously and in 
addition shows us the direct and indirect effects of each of the variables
13.  
Specifically, suppose we are interested in knowing whether a variable Z is robust 
in predicting property rights protection, we estimate regressions of the form: 
Property Rights = a + bz Z + bxj Xj + e                (1) 
where xj∈X is a vector of up to three variables taken from the pool X of N 
variables. The regression is estimated for all M possible combinations of xj∈X and for 
each model j, the estimate bzj and the corresponding standard deviation szj are identified. 
At the 5% level at which EBA is performed in the Levine and Renelt study, the lower 
extreme bound is the lowest value of bzj -2 szj  and the upper extreme bound is the largest 
value of bzj + 2szj. According to EBA, variable z is robust only if both bounds are of the 
same sign. The extreme bounds consistent with a 1% significance level are bzj -3szj (lower 
extreme bound) and bzj + 3szj (upper extreme bound). 
                                                 
13 EBA may be considered to be a parameter estimation analysis where as DAG is a model specification 
analysis.    28
However, Sala-i-Martin (1997) points out that the extreme bounds test is too strict 
a test especially in the presence of multicollinearity. Instead, he suggests that rather than 
focusing on extreme bounds, one should focus on the entire distribution of the estimators, 
specifically the fraction of the cumulative distribution lying on each side of zero, CDF 
(0). If CDF (0) is >0.95, then the variable is considered to be robust. The cumulative 
distribution function itself is calculated from the weighted mean and weighted standard 
deviation of the parameter with the integrated likelihood of each model being used as 
weights. So under the assumption that the distribution of the estimates of bz across 
models is normal, for each of the M models, we compute the integrated likelihood Lj. 
From this, the weighted mean and weighted standard deviation, which are used as 
parameters in the cumulative distribution function, are calculated where the weights used 
are proportional to the integrated likelihoods. See Sala-i-Martin (1997) for more details. 
Table 6 replicates our analysis using EBA and the Sala-i-Martin (1997) 
specification for Common Law, Latitude and Ethnic Fractionalization at the 5% level and 
for Latitude and Ethnic Fractionalization at the 1% level since in the latter case, only 
these two variables are found to be significant in predicting Property Rights when used 
by themselves. Panels A1 and A2 present the extreme bounds for the variable at the 5% 
significance level (bzj ±2szj) and 1% significance levels (bzj ±3szj) respectively and the 
corresponding conditioning information set.  
At the 5% level, the extreme lower bound for Ethnic Fractionalization is -0.447 
and is attained when we include Common Law along with Ethnic Fractionalization in the 
Property Rights regression. The upper extreme bound for  Ethnic  Fractionalization  is        
-0.031 and is attained when we include both Latitude and Catholic Religion along with   29
Ethnic Fractionalization in the Property Rights regression. The coefficients of Ethnic 
Fractionalization at the two extreme bounds are of the same sign and are significant 
indicating that Ethnic Fractionalization is a robust predictor of Property Rights, robust to 
any changes in the conditioning information set. A similar analysis for Latitude and 
Common Law, the only other variables that were significant in the property rights 
regression at the 5% level, reveals that at the respective lower and upper extreme bounds, 
the coefficients of both variables are of the same signs confirming our previous results in 
Figure 3B, that at the 5% level, Ethnic Fractionalization, Common Law and Latitude are 
robust predictors of property rights. 
Panel A2 presents EBA analysis at the 1% level for Ethnic Fractionalization and 
Latitude, which are the only variables significant in the property rights regression at the 
1% level to start with. EBA analysis at the 1% level reveals that both Latitude and Ethnic 
Fractionalization are not robust predictors since the upper extreme bound in the case of 
Ethnic Fractionalization (t-stat = -2.42) and the lower extreme bound in the case of 
Latitude (t-stat = 2.37) are not significant at the 1% level.  
The EBA analysis in Panel A2 can be reconciled with the DAG analysis in Figure 
3A by noting that in the case of Ethnic Fractionalization the insignificant upper extreme 
bound (at the 1% level) involves Catholic Religion in the conditioning information set. 
Catholic Religion is insignificant (unconditional correlation) when entered alone in the 
Property Rights Regression and hence in the case of DAG analysis does not play a part in 
computing conditional correlations. If we were to impose the same criterion for EBA and   30
remove all instances where Catholic Religion is part of the conditioning information set, 
we find that Ethnic Fractionalization is the only robust predictor of property rights
14.  
Panel B presents results from application of the Sala-i-Martin (1997) 
methodology. As expected, this method is less strict in picking out the most robust 
predictor and therefore cannot distinguish as well among different historical 
determinants. At the 5% level, Latitude, Common Law and Ethnic Fractionalization have 
CDF (0)>0.95
15 indicating they are robust predictors of Property Rights. The same holds 
for the 1% level. While this method is less able to distinguish between the different 
theories it is important to note that even in this method, Ethnic Fractionalization is a 
robust predictor of Property Rights protection. 
 
5. Monte Carlo Simulations 
  In this section, we use Monte Carlo simulations to test the reliability of the model 
obtained by DAG analysis. Since the models obtained through DAG analysis are the 
results of an automated search procedure, accounting for the potential errors associated 
with the search itself is important. One of the drawbacks of hypothesis testing in any 
algorithm based approach such as TETRAD is that error probabilities of the search 
procedures are almost impossible to determine. This is because the p- level of a test is not 
directly related to the probability of error in a search procedure that involves testing a 
series of hypothesis. If, for example, for each pair of a set of variables, hypotheses of 
                                                 
14 In that case at the 1% level, the upper extreme bound for Ethnic Fractionalization is 0.027 with a t-stat = 
-2.63 and is achieved when the conditioning information set includes only Latitude. The lower extreme 
bound is -0.509 with a t-stat = -5.22 for a conditioning information set that consists of Common Law. The 
coefficient of Ethnic Fractionalization at the two extreme bounds is significant and of the same sign 
confirming it is a robust predictor of property rights. 
15 Note that in keeping with the convention in Sala-i-Martin (1997), CDF (0) is the larger of the two areas 
under the density curve when divided by zero. So it could be either CDF(0) or 1-CDF(0) and is therefore 
always a number between 0.5 and 1   31
independence are tested at p = 0.05, then 0.05 is not the probability of erroneously 
finding some dependent set of variables when in fact all pairs are independent.  
  However, simulation methods can be used to reliably test for the error 
probabilities associated with the outcome search. Specifically, given the model in Figure 
3A from a sample of 158 countries, we first estimate the model and then use the 
estimated model to generate a number of samples of varying sizes. We then run the 
search procedure on each sample and calculate the frequency with which the relation we 
are interested in, Ethnic FractionalizationÆ Property Rights, is incorrect in the output. 
Alternatively, we can generate a hypothetical model M' where say in addition to Ethnic 
FractionalizationÆ Property Rights, Common LawÆ Property Rights and LatitudeÆ 
Property Rights. We estimate M' and use M' to generate a number of samples of size n, 
run the search procedure on each sample and calculate the frequency with which we only 
find Ethnic FractionalizationÆ Property Rights (and not Common Æ Property Rights or 
LatitudeÆProperty Rights) in the output. For all the simulations we generate 100 
samples at five different sample sizes, 50, 100, 150, 200 and 250.  
  Table 7 presents the results from the Monte Carlo simulations performed on 2000 
randomly generated datasets. In Panel A, the simulations were carried out on a model 
similar to Figure 3A imposing the 2-Tier temporal order where Tier 1 consists of 
Latitude, Common Law, Catholic Religion and Ethnic Fractionalization and Tier 2 
consists of Property Rights. The significance levels at which the tests were carried out 
were 5% and 1%. The number in each cell presents the frequency with which we don’t 
find Ethnic Fractionalization Æ Property Rights. At both the 5% and 1% level, the results 
show that at sample sizes above 100, Ethnic Fractionalization is found to be a strong   32
predictor of Property Rights protection. Note that these results correspond to finding the 
frequency of Type I error of the algorithm which is the probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis when it is true. 
  To investigate the power of the algorithm against alternate models, we consider a 
modification of the model in Figure 3A where we add the edges Common LawÆ 
Property Rights and Latitude Æ Property Rights (so similar to Figure 3B). We generate 
100 samples at each of the five sample sizes (50, 100, 150, 200, 250). Panel B shows that 
at sample sizes of 50, in 6% of the cases we find only Ethnic FractionalizationÆ Property 
Rights and not Common Law Æ Property Rights or LatitudeÆ Property Rights (Type II 
or all three but this reduces to 0% at larger sample sizes of 100 or more observations. 
Even for the 1% level of significance at which the conditional correlation tests are 
conducted, the results in Panel B show that the probability of a Type II error (probability 
of not rejecting the null hypothesis when an alternative is true) is zero at sample sizes of 
100 or more observations. The results thus show that the tests have high power
16 in 
making a correct decision and the algorithm is sufficiently reliable in detecting alternate 
causal influences if they are strong.  
 
6. Conclusion 
  Using cross-country data, this paper evaluates historical determinants of 
protection of property rights.  We examine four historical theories that focus on different 
distinct causal mechanisms in shaping institutions, as captured by legal origin, 
endowments, ethnic diversity and religion.  We use Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) 
                                                 
16 Note that Power of a test measures the test’s ability to reject the null hypothesis when it is actually false, 
i.e. the probability of not committing a Type II error. In our case, the power of the test ranges from 94% (1-
β=1-0.06) to 100% (1-0.00)   33
methodology to identify which historical factors are direct determinants of property rights 
protection and which are not, and illustrate how regression-based analyses can lead to 
misleading results.   The empirical results support the ethnic fractionalization view as a 
determinant of property rights protection.  These results are robust to DAG model 
specification, sample composition including random sample sorts, use of alternative 
proxies for Endowment views, and different definitions of property rights protection. We 
also compare our analysis to Extreme Bounds Analysis and get similar results. 
  Despite the attention it has received in the literature, support in the data for the 
proposition that legal origin is a significant determinant of the protection of property 
rights is fragile and is dependent on the inclusion of transition economies in the sample.     34
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Figures: Directed Acyclic Graphs 
The following set of figures show graphical relations between different set of variables derived from the unconditional and conditional correlations. A single headed arrow between variables A and B 
with the arrowhead at B implies A causes B. A double headed arrow between variables A and B implies an inconsistent direction of orientation (causation) between the two variables and a dotted line 
between A and B implies a common latent factor could be driving the correlations between the two variables. A and B could be Property Rights, Common Law Dummy, Latitude, Ethnic 
Fractionalization or Catholic Religion. Property Rights, scored from 1 to 5, reflects the degree to which government enforces laws that protect private property, with higher numbers indicating better 
enforcement. Common Law Dummy takes the value 1 for Common Law countries and 0 otherwise. Catholic Religion takes the value 1 if Catholics are the dominant religious group in the country and 0 
if it is some other religious group. Ethnic Fractionalization is the probability that, two randomly selected individuals in a country, do not belong to the same ethnic group. Ethnic Fractionalization 
(quintiles) takes values 1 to 5 according to the five quintiles of ethnic fractionalization. Latitude is the absolute value of the latitude of the country scaled between zero and one. Latitude (quintiles) takes 
values 1 to 5 according to the five quintiles of the latitude variable. Property Rights are from the Heritage Foundation for the year 2000. 





Figure 2: Directed Acyclic Graphs - Assuming no temporal order  
2A: 1% Significance Level      2B: 5% Significance  Level    2C:  10% Significance Level 
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Figure 3: Directed Acyclic Graphs - Assuming 2-Tier temporal order  
Tier 1: Latitude, Ethnic Fractionalization, Common Law, Catholic Religion 
Tier 2: Property Rights 
3A: 1% Significance Level      3B: 5% Significance  Level    3C:  10% Significance Level 
 
   
 
 
Figure 4: Directed Acyclic Graphs - Assuming 3-Tier temporal order  
Tier 1: Latitude 
Tier 2: Ethnic Fractionalization, Common Law, Catholic Religion 
Tier 3: Property Rights 
 
4A: 1% Significance Level      4B: 5% Significance  Level    4C:  10% Significance Level 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Property Rights, scored from 1 to 5, reflects the degree to which government enforces laws that protect private property, with higher 
numbers indicating better enforcement. Common Law Dummy takes the value 1 for Common Law countries and 0 otherwise. Catholic 
Religion takes the value 1 if Catholics are the dominant religious group in the country and 0 if it is some other religious group. Ethnic 
Fractionalization is the probability that, two randomly selected individuals in a country, do not belong to the same ethnic group. 
Ethnic Fractionalization (quintiles) takes values 1 to 5 according to the five quintiles of ethnic fractionalization. Latitude is the 
absolute value of the latitude of the country scaled between zero and one. Latitude (quintiles) takes values 1 to 5 according to the five 
















Albania 2  0  0 0.2204 2 0.4556  4 
Algeria 3  0  0  0.3394  2  0.3111  3 
Angola 2  0  1  0.7867  5  0.1367  2 
Argentina 4  0  1  0.255  2  0.3778  4 
Armenia 3  0  0  0.1272  1  0.4444  4 
Australia 5  1  0  0.0929  1  0.3000  3 
Austria 5  0  1  0.1068  1  0.5244  5 
Azerbaijan 2  0  0  0.2047  2  0.4478  4 
Bahamas, The  5  1  0  0.4228  3  0.2683  3 
Bahrain 5  1  0  0.5021  3  0.2889  3 
Bangladesh 2  1  0  0.0454  1  0.2667  3 
Barbados 4  1  0  0.1423  1  0.1456  2 
Belarus 2  0  0  0.3222  2  0.5889  5 
Belgium 5  0  1  0.5554  4  0.5611  5 
Belize 3  1  1  0.7015  4  0.1906  2 
Benin 3  0  0  0.7872  5  0.1033  1 
Bolivia 3  0  1  0.7396  5  0.1889  2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  1  0  0  0.63  4  0.4889  4 
Botswana 4  1  0  0.4102  3  0.2444  3 
Brazil 3  0  1  0.5408  4  0.1111  1 
Bulgaria 3  0  0  0.4021  3  0.4778  4 
Burkina Faso  3  0  0  0.7377  5  0.1444  2 
Burundi 2  0  1  0.2951  2  0.0367  1 
Cambodia 2  0  0  0.2105  2  0.1444  2 
Cameroon 2  0  1  0.8635  5  0.0667  1 
Canada 5  1  1  0.7124  5  0.6667  5 
Cape Verde  4  0  1  0.4174  3  0.1778  2 
Chad 2  0  0  0.862  5  0.1667  2 
Chile 5  0  1  0.1861  2  0.3333  3 
China 2  0  0  0.1538  1  0.3889  4 
Colombia 3  0  1  0.6014  4  0.0444  1 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1  0  1  0.8747  5  0.0000  1 
Congo, Rep.  2  0  1  0.8747  5  0.0111  1 
Costa Rica  3  0  1  0.2368  2  0.1111  1 
Croatia 2  0  1  0.369  3  0.5011  5 
Cuba 1  0  0  0.5908  4  0.2367  3 
Cyprus 4  1  0  0.0939  1  0.3889  4 
Czech Republic  4  0  0  0.3222  2  0.5494  5 
Denmark 5  0  0  0.0819  1  0.6222  5 
Djibouti 3  0  0  0.7962  5  0.1256  2 
Dominican Republic  2  0  1  0.4294  3  0.2111  2 
Ecuador 3  0  1  0.655  4  0.0222  1 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  3  0  0  0.1836  2  0.3000  3 
El Salvador  4  0  1  0.1978  2  0.1500  2 
Equatorial Guinea  1  0  1  0.3467  2  0.0222  1 
Estonia 4  0  0  0.5062  3  0.6556  5 
Ethiopia 2  1  0  0.7235  5  0.0889  1 
Fiji 3  1  0  0.5479  4  0.2000  2 
Finland 5  0  0  0.1315  1  0.7111  5 
France 4  0  1  0.1032  1  0.5111  5 
Gabon 3  0  1  0.769  5  0.0111  1 












(quintiles)  Latitude 
Latitude 
(quintiles) 
Georgia 2  0  0 0.4923 3 0.4667  4 
Germany 5  0  0  0.1682  1  0.5667  5 
Ghana 3  1  0  0.6733  4  0.0889  1 
Greece 4  0  0  0.1576  1  0.4333  4 
Guatemala 3  0  1  0.5122  3  0.1700  2 
Guinea 2  0  0  0.7389  5  0.1222  1 
Guinea-Bissau 1  0  0  0.8082  5  0.1333  2 
Guyana 3  1  0  0.6195  4  0.0556  1 
Haiti 1  0  1  0.095  1  0.2111  2 
Honduras 3  0  1  0.1867  2  0.1667  2 
Hong Kong, China  5  1  0  0.062  1  0.2461  3 
Hungary 4  0  1  0.1522  1  0.5222  5 
Iceland 5  0  0  0.0798  1  0.7222  5 
India 3  1  0  0.4182  3  0.2222  2 
Indonesia 3  0  0  0.7351  5  0.0556  1 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  1  1  0  0.6684  4  0.3556  4 
Iraq 1  0  0  0.3689  2  0.3667  4 
Ireland 5  1  1  0.1206  1  0.5889  5 
Israel 4  1  0  0.3436  2  0.3478  4 
Italy 4  0  1  0.1145  1  0.4722  4 
Jamaica 4  1  0  0.4129  3  0.2017  2 
Japan 5  0  0  0.0119  1  0.4000  4 
Jordan 4  0  0  0.5926  4  0.3444  3 
Kazakhstan 2  0  0  0.6171  4  0.5333  5 
Kenya 3  1  0  0.8588  5  0.0111  1 
Korea, Dem. Rep.  1  0  0  0.0392  1  0.4444  4 
Korea, Rep.  5  0  0  0.002  1  0.4111  4 
Kuwait 5  0  0  0.6604  4  0.3256  3 
Kyrgyz Republic  2  0  0  0.6752  4  0.4556  4 
Latvia 3  0  0  0.5867  4  0.6333  5 
Lebanon 3  0  0  0.1314  1  0.3722  4 
Lesotho 3  1  1  0.255  2  0.3256  3 
Libya 1  0  0  0.792  5  0.2778  3 
Lithuania 3  0  1  0.3223  2  0.6222  5 
Luxembourg 5  0  1  0.5302  3  0.5494  5 
Madagascar 3  0  0  0.8791  5  0.2222  2 
Malawi 3  1  0  0.6744  4  0.1478  2 
Malaysia 4  1  0  0.588  4  0.0256  1 
Mali 3  0  0  0.6906  4  0.1889  2 
Malta 4  0  1  0.0414  1  0.3944  4 
Mauritania 2  0  0  0.615  4  0.2222  2 
Mauritius 4  0  0  0.4634  3  0.2241  3 
Mexico 3  0  1  0.5418  4  0.2556  3 
Moldova 3  0  0  0.5535  4  0.5222  5 
Mongolia 3  0  0  0.3682  2  0.5111  5 
Morocco 3  0  0  0.4841  3  0.3556  4 
Mozambique 2  0  0  0.6932  4  0.2017  2 
Myanmar 2  0  0  0.5062  3  0.2444  3 
Namibia 4  1  0  0.6329  4  0.2444  3 
Nepal 3  1  0  0.6632  4  0.3111  3 
Netherlands 5  0  1  0.1054  1  0.5811  5 
New Zealand  5  1  0  0.3969  3  0.4556  4 
Nicaragua 2  0  1  0.4844  3  0.1444  2 
Niger 2  0  0  0.6518  4  0.1778  2 
Nigeria 2  1  0  0.8505  5  0.1111  1 
Norway 5  0  0  0.0586  1  0.6889  5 
Oman 3  0  0  0.4373  3  0.2333  3 
Pakistan 2  1  0  0.7098  5  0.3333  3 
Panama 3  0  1  0.5528  4  0.1000  1 
Papua New Guinea  3  1  0  0.2718  2  0.0667  1 












(quintiles)  Latitude 
Latitude 
(quintiles) 
Peru 3  0  1 0.6566 4 0.1111  1 
Philippines 4  0  1  0.2385  2  0.1444  2 
Poland 4  0  1  0.1183  1  0.5778  5 
Portugal 4  0  1  0.0468  1  0.4367  4 
Qatar 3  0  0  0.7456  5  0.2811  3 
Romania 2  0  0  0.3069  2  0.5111  5 
Russian Federation  3  0  0  0.2452  2  0.6667  5 
Rwanda 1  0  1  0.3238  2  0.0222  1 
Samoa 3  1  0  0.1376  1  0.1483  2 
Saudi Arabia  3  1  0  0.18  2  0.2778  3 
Senegal 3  0  0  0.6939  4  0.1556  2 
Sierra Leone  2  1  0  0.8191  5  0.0922  1 
Singapore 5  1  0  0.3857  3  0.0136  1 
Slovak Republic  3  0  1  0.2539  2  0.5378  5 
Slovenia 4  0  1  0.2216  2  0.5111  5 
Somalia 1  1  0  0.8117  5  0.1111  1 
South Africa  3  1  0  0.7517  5  0.3222  3 
Spain 4  0  1  0.4165  3  0.4444  4 
Sri Lanka  3  1  0  0.415  3  0.0778  1 
Sudan 2  1  0  0.7147  5  0.1667  2 
Suriname 3  0  0  0.7332  5  0.0444  1 
Swaziland 4  1  0  0.0582  1  0.2922  3 
Sweden 4  0  0  0.06  1  0.6889  5 
Switzerland 5  0  1  0.5314  3  0.5222  5 
Syrian Arab Republic  2  0  0  0.5399  3  0.3889  4 
Taiwan, China  5  0  0  0.2744  2  0.2589  3 
Tajikistan 2  0  0  0.5107  3  0.4333  4 
Tanzania 3  1  0  0.7353  5  0.0667  1 
Thailand 4  1  0  0.6338  4  0.1667  2 
Togo 2  0  0  0.7099  5  0.0889  1 
Trinidad and Tobago  5  1  1  0.6475  4  0.1222  1 
Tunisia 3  0  0  0.0394  1  0.3778  4 
Turkey 4  0  0  0.32  2  0.4333  4 
Turkmenistan 2  0  0  0.3918  3  0.4444  4 
Uganda 3  1  1  0.9302  5  0.0111  1 
Ukraine 2  0  0  0.4737  3  0.5444  5 
United Arab Emirates  5  1  0  0.6252  4  0.2667  3 
United Kingdom  5  1  0  0.1211  1  0.6000  5 
United States  5  1  0  0.4901  3  0.4222  4 
Uruguay 4  0  1  0.2504  2  0.3667  4 
Uzbekistan 2  0  0  0.4125  3  0.4556  4 
Venezuela, RB  3  0  1  0.4966  3  0.0889  1 
Vietnam 1  0  0  0.2383  2  0.1778  2 
Zambia 3  1  0  0.7808  5  0.1667  2 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Panel A presents the summary statistics and Panel B presents the correlation matrix between the variables. P-values are listed in 
parentheses in panel B. The variables are defined as follows: Property Rights, scored from 1 to 5, reflects the degree to which 
government enforces laws that protect private property, with higher numbers indicating better enforcement. Common Law takes the 
value 1 for Common Law countries and 0 for other countries. Catholic Religion takes the value 1 if Catholics are the dominant 
religious group in the country and 0 if it is some other religious group. Ethnic Fractionalization is the probability that, two randomly 
selected individuals in a country, do not belong to the same ethnic group. Latitude is the absolute value of the latitude of the country 
scaled between zero and one. Latitude and Ethnic Fractionalization are re-scaled into quintiles. Property Rights are from the Heritage 
Foundation for the year 2000. 
 
Panel A:  
Variable N  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Property Rights  158  3.13  1.19  1  5 
Common Law  158  0.3  0.46  0  1 
Catholic 
Religion 158  0.32  0.47  0  1 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization   158  2.99  1.42  1  5 
Latitude 158  2.96  1.43  1  5 
       
 










Common Law  0.1813
b      
        
Catholic Religion  0.0938  -0.2794
a    




 b -0.0895   
        
Latitude 0.3358
 a -0.2621
a -0.067  -0.5459
a 
        
 
a and 
b represent significance at 1 and 5% respectively.   43
 
Table 3: Independence Relations found by Tetrad 
The variables are defined as follows: Property Rights, scored from 1 to 5, reflects the degree to which government enforces laws that 
protect private property, with higher numbers indicating better enforcement. Common Law takes the value 1 for Common Law 
countries and 0 for other countries. Catholic Religion takes the value 1 if Catholics are the dominant religious group in the country and 
0 if it is some other religious group. Ethnic Fractionalization is the probability that, two randomly selected individuals in a country, do 
not belong to the same ethnic group. Latitude is the absolute value of the latitude of the country scaled between zero and one. Latitude 
and Ethnic Fractionalization are re-scaled into quintiles. Property Rights are from the Heritage Foundation for the year 2000. The table 
shows the sample correlations and p-values that correspond to the probability that the absolute value of the sample (partial) correlation 
exceeds the observed value, on the assumption of zero (partial) correlation in the population, assuming a multi-normal distribution. 
 
Panel A: 5% Significance Level 
 
  
(Partial) Correlation  Sample 
Correlation 
p-values Edge  Removed 
Independence Relations 
I  Rho (Property Rights, Catholic)   0.0938  0.2418  Property Rights—Catholic Religion       
II  Rho (Catholic, Ethnic Fractionalization)  -0.0895 0.2639  Catholic---Ethnic Fractionalization 
III  Rho (Catholic, Latitude)   -0.0670  0.4042  Catholic---Latitude 
Conditional Independence Relations 
IV  Rho (Common, Ethnic Fractionalization | Latitude) 0.0229  0.7761  Common---  Ethnic Fractionalization    44
Table 4: Determinants of Property Rights Protection-OLS Regressions 
The regression equation estimated is Outcome Variable= a + b1 Common Law + b2 Catholic Religion + b3 Ethnic Fractionalization + b4 Latitude + e. In Panel A, specifications (1)-(4), the outcome 
variable is Property Rights, in specifications (5)-(7), the outcome variable is Latitude, in specifications (8)-(10), the outcome variable is Ethnic Fractionalization, in specifications (11)-(13), the outcome 
variable is Common Law, in specifications (14)-(16), the outcome variable is Catholic Religion. The variables are defined as follows: Property Rights, scored from 1 to 5, reflects the degree to which 
government enforces laws that protect private property, with higher numbers indicating better enforcement. Common Law takes the value 1 for Common Law countries and 0 for other countries. 
Catholic Religion takes the value 1 if Catholics are the dominant religious group in the country and 0 if it is some other religious group. Ethnic Fractionalization is the probability that, two randomly 
selected individuals in a country, do not belong to the same ethnic group. Latitude is the absolute value of the latitude of the country scaled between zero and one. Property Rights are from the Heritage 
Foundation for the year 2000. Latitude and Ethnic Fractionalization are re-scaled into quintiles.  
 
Panel A: Independence Relations Implied by OLS 























a            -0.541
a     -0.084
a     -0.022     
  (0.063)            (0.066)    (0.025)    (0.026)    
Ethnic   -0.290
a    -0.551
a          0.053
b     -0.03   
    (0.063)      (0.068)          (0.026)     (0.026)   
Common 
Law     0.467
b     -0.813
a     0.497
b    
      -0.284
a 
     (0.203)     (0.240)     (0.243)         (0.078) 
Catholic 
Religion      0.238      -0.205     -0.271      -0.275
a    
 
       (0.202)    (0.244)    (0.241)    (0.076)      
N  158 158 158  158  158  158  158 158 158 158 158  158  158 158 158 158 
R-squared  0.113  0.12  0.033  0.009  0.298  0.069  0.004 0.298 0.026 0.008 0.069  0.026  0.078 0.004 0.008 0.078 
a and 
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Panel B: Conditional Independence Relations Implied by OLS 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 























a      0.174
b 0.342
a 0.286
a      
  (0.063)      [0.073]  [0.062]  [0.063]     
Ethnic   -0.290
a    -0.195
a     -0.323
a -0.286
a  
   (0.063)    [0.074]    [0.062]  [0.063]  
Common 
Law    0.467




     (0.203)    [0.193]  [0.190]  [0.210] 
Catholic 
Religion      0.238     0.296    0.161  0.398
 
      (0.202)     [0.191]    [0.191]  [0.206] 
N  158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 
R-
squared 0.113  0.12  0.033 0.009 0.151 0.191 0.126 0.178 0.124 0.056 
a  and 
b represent significance at 1 and 5% respectively. 
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Table 5: Determinants of Property Rights Protection-Robustness using TETRAD 
Panel A presents the pattern for different samples of countries. Panel B uses Good Crops as an alternative indicator to Latitude. And Panel C uses Settler Mortality as an alternative indicator to Latitude. 
Panel D uses an alternate measure of property rights protection: Risk of Expropriation from PRS. Panel E uses alternate dependent variables: Legal Formalism, Procedural Complexity and Number of 
Procedures. Panel F presents random sorts. The variables are defined as follows: Property Rights, scored from 1 to 5, reflects the degree to which government enforces laws that protect private property, 
with higher numbers indicating better enforcement. Property Rights are from the Heritage Foundation for the year 2000. Common Law takes the value 1 for Common Law countries and 0 for other 
countries. Catholic Religion takes the value 1 if Catholics are the dominant religious group in the country and 0 if it is some other religious group. Ethnic Fractionalization is the probability that, two 
randomly selected individuals in a country, do not belong to the same ethnic group. Latitude is the absolute value of the latitude of the country scaled between zero and one. Good Crops equals 
(1+zmaize+zwheat)/(1+zrice+zsugarcane), where zX equals the share of the land area that is judged to be suitable by FAO for growing crop X. Data are from Easterly and Levine (2003). Settler 
Mortality is the log of the annualized deaths per thousand European soldiers in European colonies in the early 19
th century. Risk of Expropriation is an index compiled by Political Risk Services and is 
the risk of expropriation of private foreign investment by government. It is scaled from 0 to 10, where a higher score means less risk. We use data for the year 1995.  Legal Formalism is a measure of 
procedural formalism in connection with collecting a bounced check. Number of Procedures is a measure of contract enforcement and is the number of procedures necessary to resolve a court case 
involving this same commercial debt. Procedural Complexity measures the difficulties in resolving the case of an unpaid commercial debt. Latitude, Ethnic Fractionalization, Settler Mortality and Good 
Crops are re-scaled into quintiles. 5% Significance Level is used for all the patterns below. Detailed Variable Definitions are in the appendix.  
Panel A : Dropping Different Samples of Countries    
Full Sample  Drop Transition  Drop Africa  Drop Latin America  Drop Settler Countries 
N=158 N=126  N=112  N=138  N=154 
Ethnic  Æ  Property Rights  Ethnic  Æ  Property Rights  Ethnic  Æ  Property Rights  Ethnic  Æ  Property Rights  Ethnic  Æ  Property Rights 
Latitude  Æ  Property Rights  Latitude  Æ  Property Rights  Common Æ Property Rights  Latitude  Æ  Property Rights  Latitude --- Common Law 
Common Æ Property Rights  Common <> Catholic  Latitude --- Common Law  Common Æ Property Rights  Catholic  Æ   Common Law 
Latitude Æ Common Law  Latitude <> Ethnic  Catholic  Æ   Common Law  Latitude --- Common Law  Ethnic Æ  Latitude 
Catholic  Æ   Common Law    Ethnic Æ  Latitude  Catholic  Æ   Common Law   
Latitude <> Ethnic      Ethnic Æ  Latitude   
    
Panel B : Use Alternative Endowments Variable- Good Crops    
Full Sample  Drop Transition  Drop Africa  Drop Latin America  Drop Settler Countries 
N=145 N=113  N=101  N=126  N=141 
Ethnic  Æ  Property Rights  Ethnic  Æ  Property Rights  Ethnic  Æ  Property Rights  Ethnic  Æ  Property Rights  Ethnic  Æ  Property Rights 
Good Crops  Æ  Property Rights  Good Crops  Æ  Property Rights  Common  LawÆ Property Rights  Good Crops  Æ  Property Rights  Good Crops  Æ  Property Rights 
Catholic  Æ   Common Law  Common Law Æ Catholic  Common Law <> Catholic  Catholic  Æ   Common Law  Catholic  Æ   Common Law 
Ethnic  ---  Common Law  Catholic --- Good Crops  Ethnic <> Good Crops  Ethnic  ---  Common Law  Ethnic  ---  Common Law 
Good Crops   Æ Ethnic  Ethnic Æ Good Crops    Good Crops   Æ Ethnic  Good Crops   Æ Ethnic 
        
Panel C : Use Alternative Endowments Variable-Settler Mortality     
Full Sample  Drop Transition  Drop Africa  Drop Latin America  Drop Settler Countries 
N=63 N=62  N=37  N=45  N=59 
Settler Mortality Æ Property Rights  Settler Mortality Æ Property 
ih
Settler Mortality Æ Property Rights  Settler Mortality Æ Property Rights  Settler Mortality Æ Property Rights 
Ethnic Æ Settler Mortality  Ethnic Æ Settler Mortality  CommonÆ Property Rights  Common Æ Property Rights  Common <> Catholic 
Common --- Settler Mortality  Common --- Settler Mortality  Settler Mortality ÆCommon Common  Æ Settler Mortality  Ethnic Æ Settler Mortality 
Catholic  Æ Common Law  Catholic  Æ Common Law  Catholic  Æ Common Law  Ethnic Æ Settler Mortality     47
 
Panel D : Use Alternative Measure of Property Rights Protection-Risk of Expropriation 
Full Sample  Drop Transition  Drop Africa  Drop Latin America  Drop Settler Countries 
N=115 N=105  N=78  N=96  N=111 
Ethnic  Æ Risk of Expropriation  Ethnic  Æ  Risk of Expropriation  Latitude Æ  Risk of Expropriation  Ethnic  Æ  Risk of Expropriation  Ethnic  Æ Risk of Expropriation 
Catholic  Æ  Common Law  Catholic  <> Common Law  Catholic  <> Common Law  Latitude  Æ  Risk of Expropriation  Catholic  Æ  Common Law 
Latitude Æ Common Law   Ethnic <> Latitude   Ethnic <> Latitude  Catholic  Æ  Common Law  Latitude Æ Common Law 
 Ethnic <> Latitude      Latitude Æ Common Law   Ethnic <> Latitude 
       Ethnic <> Latitude   
          
Panel E : Use Alternative Dependent Variables    
Legal Formalism  Procedural Complexity  Number of Procedures   
N=102 N=107 N=107   
Common Law Æ Formalism 
Common Law  Æ  Procedural  
 Complexity  Ethnic Æ  No. of Procedures   
Catholic Æ Common Law  Catholic Æ Procedural Complexity  Common Law Æ No. of Procedures   
Common Law --- Latitude  Catholic <> Common  Catholic <> Common   
 Ethnic Æ Latitude   Ethnic <>  Latitude   Ethnic <> Latitude   
    
    
Panel F: 100 Random Sorts       
Only Ethnic  34     
Only Latitude  14       
Ethnic and Latitude  12       
Ethnic and Common  11       
Latitude and Common  25       
Ethnic, Latitude and Common  2       
Latitude and Catholic  1       
Latitude, Common and Catholic  1       
  100       
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Table 6: Testing the Robustness of Ethnic using Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) 
 
Panels A1 and A2 presents the results from extreme bounds analysis (EBA). Panel B presents robustness results using the Sala-i-Martin (1997) method. The regression equation estimated is Property 
Rights = a + b1 Legal Origin + b2 Religion + b3 Ethnic Fractionalization + b4 Latitude + e. Panels A1 and A2 present the lower and extreme bound values and the corresponding t-stats and p-values.  The 
conditioning information set associated with the two extreme bounds are also reported. In Panels A1 and A2, the variable is said to be robust if the coefficient of the variable at the two extreme bounds is 
statistically significant (at 5% or 1% respectively) and of the same sign. Panel B presents the weighted mean and weighted standard deviation for each variable across all possible conditioning 
information sets. The weights are proportional to the likelihoods of each model and are described in Sala-i-Martin (1997).  Panel B also reports the cumulative normal distribution function at zero 
(CDF(0)) using the weighted mean and weighted standard deviation as parameters. A variable is said to be robust if CDF(0)>0.95. The variables are defined as follows: Property Rights, scored from 1 to 
5, reflects the degree to which government enforces laws that protect private property, with higher numbers indicating better enforcement. Property Rights are from the Heritage Foundation for the year 
2000. Legal Origin takes the value 1 for Common Law countries, 2 for French civil law countries, 3 for German Civil law countries and Scandinavian civil law countries and 4 for Socialist Law 
countries.  Religion takes the value 1 if Catholics are the dominant religious group in the country, 2 if Muslims are the dominant religious group, 3 if Protestants are the dominant religious group and 4 if 
it is some other religious group. Ethnic Fractionalization is the probability that, two randomly selected individuals in a country, do not belong to the same ethnic group. Latitude is the absolute value of 
the latitude of the country scaled between zero and one. Latitude and Ethnic Fractionalization are re-scaled into quintiles. Detailed Variable Definitions are in the appendix.  
 
Panel A1: Extreme Bounds Analysis at 5% Significance Level 
   Conditioning Information Set  Coefficient  t-stat  Extreme Bound value  p-value Robust/Not  Robust
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION             
Upper Extreme Bound  Latitude, Catholic -0.181  -2.42  -0.031  0.017  Robust 
Lower Extreme Bound  Common Law  -0.323  -5.22  -0.447  0.000   
            
LATITUDE            
Upper Extreme Bound  Common Law, Catholic  0.370  6.03  0.492  0.000  Robust 
Lower Extreme Bound  Ethnic Fractionalization  0.174  2.37  0.028  0.019   
            
COMMON LAW             
Upper Extreme Bound  Latitude, Catholic 0.930  4.70  1.326  0.000  Robust 
Lower Extreme Bound  Catholic  0.580  2.77  0.160  0.006   
            
Panel A1: Extreme Bounds Analysis at 1% Significance Level 
   Conditioning Information Set  Coefficient  t-stat  Extreme Bound value  p-value Robust/Not  Robust
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION             
Upper Extreme Bound  Latitude, Catholic -0.181  -2.42  0.044  0.017  Not  Robust 
Lower Extreme Bound  Common Law  -0.323  -5.22  -0.509  0.000   
            
LATITUDE            
Upper Extreme Bound  Common Law, Catholic  0.370  6.03  0.553  0.000  Not Robust 
Lower Extreme Bound  Ethnic Fractionalization  0.174  2.37  -0.045  0.019   
            
   49
 
Panel B: Sala-i-Martin Specification 







Function (0)  Robust (>0.95) / Not Robust  Robust (>0.99) / Not Robust 
Ethnic Fractionalization  -0.240  0.068  0.999  Robust  Robust 
Latitude 0.265  0.068  0.999  Robust  Robust 
Common Law  0.754  0.196  0.999  Robust  Robust   50
Table 7: Determining Error Probabilities using Monte Carlo Analysis 
 
Panel A presents the results from Monte Carlo Simulations performed at differing significance levels. The null hypothesis tested is Only Ethnic Æ Property Rights. The 2-Tier Temporal Order 
corresponds to Figure 3 where Tier 1 consists of Latitude, Common Law, Catholic Religion and Ethnic Fractionalization and Tier 2 consists of Property Rights. The number in each cell in panel A 
represents the frequency (out of a 100 datasets) with which the null hypothesis is rejected. In Panel B, the alternate model is EthnicÆ Property Rights and Latitude Æ Property Rights and Common 
LawÆ Property Rights. The number in each cell represents the frequency (out of a 100 datasets) with which the null hypothesis (Only Ethnic Æ Property Rights and Latitude and Common Law do not 
affect Property Rights) is accepted.  
 
Panel A: Percentage of Type I errors  
  Sample  Size  50  100 150 200 250 
Null Hypothesis: Ethnic --> Property Rights 
Significance =5%                
Percentage of cases when the null was rejected (α)  44  21 4 11 4 
       
Significance =1%       
Percentage of cases when the null was rejected (α)  75 45 18  6  3 
 
Panel B: Percentage of Type II Errors from Alternate Model 
  Sample  Size  50  100 150 200 250 
Alternate Model: EthnicÆ Property Rights and  Latitude Æ Property Rights and Common  --> Property Rights 
Significance =5%       
Percentage of cases when null is accepted (β)  6 0 0 0 0 
Significance =1%       
Percentage of cases when null is accepted (β)  9 0 0 0 0   51
Appendix A1: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition      Source 
Dependent Variables      
Property Rights 
Scored from 1 to 5, property rights reflects the degree to which 
government enforces laws that protect private property, with higher 
numbers indicating better enforcement. Year 2000 values are used.    Heritage Foundation 
Risk of Expropriation 
Risk of expropriation of private foreign investment by government, from 
0 to 10, where a higher score means less risk. We use the 1995 values.   
The original compilers of the data are Political Risk 
Services. They are organized in electronic form by the 
IRIS Center.  
Legal Formalism 
Scored 1 to 7, it is an index for formality in legal procedures for 
collecting a bounced check   
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2003) 
Number of Procedures 
Number of procedures involved in collecting a commercial debt valued 
at 50% of annual GDP per capita    World Bank Doing Business Database 
Procedural Complexity 
Index of complexity involved in collecting a commercial debt valued at 
50% of annual GDP per capita     
      
Independent Variables      
Legal Origin 
An indicator of the type of legal system in the country. It takes the value 
1 for English Common law, 2 for French Civil Law, 3 for German Civil 
Law, 4 for Scandinavian Civil Law and 5 for Socialist Law countries   
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1999) 
Common 
Common Law dummy that takes the value 1 for English Common Law 
countries and 0 otherwise   
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1999) 
Catholic Religion 
An indicator of the dominant religious group in the country. It takes the 
value 1 for Catholics, 0 for Protestants, Muslims, and all Other Religions   
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1999) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
Probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country do not 
belong to the same ethnic group    Alesina, et al (2003) 
Latitude  Absolute value of the latitude of a country, scaled between zero and one   
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1999) 
Good Crops 
Good Crops equals (1+zmaize+zwheat)/(1+zrice+zsugarcane), where zX 
equals the share of the land area that is judged to be suitable by FAO for 
growing crop X.     Easterly and Levine (2003) 
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Appendix A2: From Conditional Independence Relations to Directed Acyclic Graphs.  
  The following steps are for the case of a two tier temporal order assuming a 5% 
significance level for the correlations: 





Step 2: Identify the edges with zero unconditional correlations: The independence 
relations found in the data by TETRAD (Table 3) are as follows:  
Property Rights is independent of Catholic Religion                  (i) 
Catholic Religion is independent of Ethnic Fractionalization             (ii) 
Catholic Religion is independent of Latitude                        (iii) 




Step 3: Identify the edges with zero conditional correlations: The conditional 








Catholic Religion  Common Law  Property Rights 
Ethnic  
Fractionalization 
Latitude   53
Common Law is independent of Ethnic Fractionalization conditional on Latitude        (iv) 
  Note that (iv) is the one and only conditional independence relation found in the 
data by TETRAD. This implies that all other dependencies assumed in Figure 2b remain. 
The conditioning variable(s) on removed edges between two variables is called the 
Sepset of the variables whose edge has been removed. Therefore  
Sepset (Common Law, Ethnic Fractionalization) = Latitude 
After imposition of equation (iv) and removal of the corresponding edges, we are left 





Step 4: Following our discussion of Causal Markov Condition in section 2.1, edges are 
directed by considering triples X—Y—Z, such that X and Y are adjacent, as are Y and Z, 
but X and Z are not adjacent. Edges between triples: X— Y— Z are directed as: XÆ YÅ 
Z, if Y is not in the sepset of X and Z. From Figure 1c we can identify the following sets 
of triples with directed edges: 
 
Catholic ReligionÆCommon LawÅProperty  Rights      (v) 
Catholic ReligionÆCommon LawÅL a t i t u d e         ( v i )  
Common Law ÆProperty RightsÅ Ethnic Fractionalization      (vii) 
Common LawÆLatitudeÅProperty  Rights         (viii) 
Common Law ÆProperty RightsÅ  Latitude       (ix) 
Common Law ÆLatitudeÅ  Ethnic  Fractionalization     (x) 
LatitudeÆEthnic FractionalizationÅProperty  Rights       (xi) 
LatitudeÆCommon LawÅProperty  Rights         (xii) 
LatitudeÆProperty RightsÅEthnic  Fractionalization       (xiii) 
Ethnic FractionalizationÆ LatitudeÅProperty  Rights     (xiv) 
 
  Note that (x) an inconsistent relation on the basis of the Causal Markov 
Condition, Common LawÆLatitudeÅEthnic Fractionalization since Latitude is in the 
sepset of Common Law and Ethnic Fractionalization and hence does not figure in the 
above set.   
  Assuming a two-tier temporal order where Tier 1 consists of Latitude, Ethnic 
Fractionalization, Common Law and Catholic Religion and Tier 2 consists of Property 
Rights, the following relations are forbidden: 
Catholic Religion  Common Law  Property Rights 
Ethnic  
Fractionalization 
Latitude   54
 
Property RightsÆ  L a t i t u d e          ( x v )  
Property RightsÆ  C o m m o n   L a w         ( x v i )  
Property RightsÆ  Catholic  Religion        (xvii) 
Property RightsÆ  Ethnic  Fractionalization       (xviii) 
This implies that the only valid directed triples are (vi), (vii), (ix) and (xiii) as shown 
below in Figure (d): 







The relationship between Latitude and Ethnic Fractionalization is indeterminate. Figure 














Catholic Religion  Common Law  Property Rights 
Ethnic  
Fractionalization 
Latitude 